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1.  Introduction 
Despite much of energy policy being a reserved issue for 
the UK Government, Scotland has pursued its own 
distinctive energy policy (Allan et al, 2008a), particularly in 
relation to climate change. The Climate Change Act 
(Scotland)  was passed in 2009 and oXWOLQHV6FRWODQG¶V
commitment to tackling climate change. It requires Scottish 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 2050 to be 80% less 
than their 1990 levels, with an interim target of a 42% 
reduction by 2020. 
 
Climate change is an international problem which appears 
to require a global solution and it is therefore not clear that 
the appropriate spatial scale for policy action is the regional 
or even national level. The Scottish Government is aware of 
WKLVEXWFODLPVWKDWVXFKHPLVVLRQV¶UHGXFWLRQWDUJHWVFDn 
EHXVHGDVDPHDQVRIVXSSRUWLQJWKH8.¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDO
commitments and also showing leadership to encourage 
other nations to tackle climate change. However, Scottish 
climate change policy must also be considered in the 
context of Scottish energy policy as a whole. The Scottish 
Government has other energy policy goals, notably security 
of supply, affordability and economic growth through the 
development of low carbon technologies, notably 
renewables. 
 
This paper is intended to provide a brief overview of the 
main issues involved in Scottish climate change policy. We 
give a brief background, in Section 2, on international, EU 
and UK climate change policy. In Section 3 we provide an 
overview of the main features of the Scottish Climate 
Change Act and highlight particular differences with the UK 
equivalent framework. In Section 4 we discuss the issues 
surrounding low carbon technologies and their impact on 
climate change policy in Scotland. We consider the policy 
instruments available to the Scottish Government while 
functioning within EU and UK frameworks in Section 5. In 
Section 6 we conclude and identify avenues for future 
research. 
____________________ 
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2.  Background on International, EU and UK 
policy 
Given the global nature of the climate change issue, most 
initial policy effort has been on international or multi-national 
levels, like the EU. There has also been considerable effort 
at the UK level. Scottish climate change policy is heavily 
influenced by and conditional upon policies at these other 
spatial levels. This section therefore gives a short summary 
of the main agreements, policies, instruments and 
legislation that affect Scotland. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is an 
international agreement that imposes reduction targets on 
GHG emissions for developed nations. It was established in 
1997, ratified in 2005 and runs from 2008-2012. No legally 
binding successor agreement has yet been agreed, 
although the informal Copenhagen Accord was adopted in 
2009 as a step towards this. Kyoto allows countries to use 
various, specifically created, flexible market mechanisms in 
meeting their emissions reduction commitments. These are 
International Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation (JI), 
and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)1. In theory 
all these mechanisms should allow emissions abatement to 
take place in the most cost effective manner i.e. where it is 
cheapest, and also allow for the diffusion of low-carbon 
technologies to developing countries. 
 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the EU-15 countries have a 
bubble which allows them to achieve together an overall 
target of an 8% reduction in emissions by 2012. In order to 
achieve this reduction the EU created its own instrument in 
the form of an emissions trading scheme, the EU ETS, in 
7KH(8(76LVDµFDSDQGWUDGH¶V\VWHPZKHUHDOLPLW
is put on total emissions based on Kyoto commitments and 
the scheme allows CO2 allowances, called European Union 
Allowances (EUAs), to be bought and sold between 
operators in certain emitting sectors2.   The sectors currently 
covered are: energy, ferrous metals, minerals, pulp and 
paper. Each EUA is equivalent to one tonne of CO2. All 
installations within these sectors require a permit to operate 
which covers almost half of EU carbon emissions. However 
the allocation of the tradable EUAs to permit holders is 
initiated at national level with individual Member States 
submitting National Allocation Plans (NAPs) to the EU 
Commission for approval on the distribution of allowances 
and details of all installations covered. Phase I of the EU 
ETS ran from 2005-2007 and Phase II runs in parallel with 
Kyoto from 2008-2012. 
 
 In 2008 the EU introduced its 20-20-20 targets for 2020. 
This EU goal requires that by the year 2020 there will be a 
20% reduction in GHG emissions, to have 20% of final 
energy consumption met from renewables and a 20% 
reduction in energy consumption through promoting energy 
efficiency. The EU stated that it would increase its 
emissions reduction commitment from 20% to 30% if an 
international successor to Kyoto was agreed and other 
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countries adopted strict targets. Although there is an EU 
renewables target, there is no EU-wide renewables3  policy 
instrument and each member state have their own 
renewables target and can meet it by whatever method they 
deem appropriate.  
 
7KH&OLPDWH&KDQJH$FWRXWOLQHVWKH8.¶VFRQWULEXWLRQ
to tackling climate change by setting UK emissions targets 
for 2020 and 2050. The Climate Change Act also created 
the Committee on Climate Change, an independent body 
tasked with advising the UK Government on setting its 
emissions targets, including 5-year carbon budgets, and 
monitoring government progress towards the targets. The 
UK emissions reduction target for 2050 of 80% is the same 
as that for Scotland4 but the 2020 target is dependent upon 
a global climate change agreement being struck. If such an 
international deal is agreed, then the EU will raise its own 
emissions reduction targets (from 20% to 30%) and thus the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) cap will be 
tightened. This will require greater reductions from UK 
installations covered by the EU ETS i.e. the traded sector, 
which includes electricity generation. Therefore the UK 
*RYHUQPHQWKDVVHWD³LQWHULPWDUJHW´RID
reduction but this ZLOOULVHWR³LQWHQGHGWDUJHW´LI
international and EU policies dictate so5. The overall UK 
target in 2020 is therefore conditional upon the EU target 
which is in turn dependent upon a global deal. This 
framework shows that the UK is willing to demonstrate 
leadership with its initial effort but that it will also commit to 
higher targets if others are willing to make more significant 
reductions. 
 
³7KLVOHDGHUVKLSDUJXPHQWLVEHVWXQGHUVWRRGLQJDPH
theory terms: it is an attempt to induce steps towards a 
global carbon cartel to reduce the quantity of emissions´6 
  
It is also worth stating that the UK has adopted a renewable 
energy target of 15% by 2020 as its contribution towards the 
wider EU renewables target. 
 
3.  Scottish Climate Change Act 
 
Strict targets 
The Climate Change (Scotland) Act sets a 2020 target 
which is more ambitious than the UK equivalent. Scotland 
has legislated for a 42% reduction in emissions regardless 
of what occurs at any other spatial level7. Such ambition 
may be laudable in principle but it must be informed by, and 
be consistent with, EU and UK policy and account for the 
likely impact of these other spatial levels. This therefore 
raises the question of whether it is possible for Scotland to 
meet the 42% target, especially if there is no global deal.  
The advice from the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) 
is that achieving the 42% target is possible but the CCC 
UHFRPPHQGVVHWWLQJVHSDUDWHWDUJHWVIRUWKHµWUDGHG¶DQG
µQRQ-WUDGHG¶VHFWRUVLQ6FRWODQG7KHWUDGHGVHFWRU
emissions wiOOEHFRXQWHGDV6FRWODQG¶VVKDUHRIWKH8.
allocation in the EU ETS (CCC, 2010). This is in the spirit of 
the EU ETS, where the geographic distribution of emission 
reductions simply reflects the least-cost locations for 
meeting the overall cap. However, it also implies that, from a 
purely Scottish perspective, any extra reduction in traded 
sector emissions, for example, associated with the 
expansion of renewable electricity generation, will not count 
towards meeting the reduction targets8. This accounting 
methodology also implies that any non-CO2 GHGs 
produced within the traded sector, such as methane, will not 
be counted as Scottish emissions9.  
 
As for the non-traded sector, the CCC predicts that, with no 
global deal, there would have to be a 47% reduction in non-
traded sector emissions to meet the overall Scottish target 
of 42%.With a global deal the non-traded sector target falls 
to 39%10. It seems perverse that the non-traded target 
shrinks if a global deal is agreed. The CCC therefore 
suggests making SFRWODQG¶VQRQ-traded target invariant to 
the achievement of a global deal. This seems logical 
because if Scotland wishes to make its framework invariant 
to international agreements, then at least one target, the 
non-traded sector, must be made invariant to reduce 
uncertainty. Given that Scotland is part of the EU ETS, there 
is nothing that can be done to make the overall target 
invariant.  
 
Annual targets 
The Climate Change (Scotland) Act has established the 
requirement of yearly carbon budgets in Scotland. It will be 
interesting to see how these are set and met in comparison 
to the UK budgets, which are set for 5-year periods. 
The frequency with which budgets are set reflects a trade-
off between certainty in the future emissions path and 
flexibility in meeting targets. Annual year-on-year targets 
provide certainty for investors, provided that there is 
confidence that these targets will be met. However, setting 
5-year budgets allows for the benefits of flexibility in 
response to uncontrollable events and a lower reporting 
burden.  
 
Of course annual targets do not necessarily imply certainty; 
increased frequency may make it more difficult consistently 
to achieve targets. For example, if a nuclear station had to 
shut one year unexpectedly then other types of electricity 
generation, most likely coal and gas, would need to make 
up the difference and thus emissions would substantially 
increase for that single year. This issue is especially 
LPSRUWDQWJLYHQ6FRWODQG¶VFXUUHQWGHSHQGHQFHRQDVPDOO
number of large generators11.  Less frequent budgets would 
allow Scotland to cope better with these unexpected 
IOXFWXDWLRQV7KH&&&¶VUHSRUWWRWKH6FRWWLVKJRYHUQPHQW
(CCC, 2010) has expressed concern with the lack of 
flexibility in the Scottish annual targets and suggests 
measures could be considered to increase flexibility, 
DOWKRXJKLWLVQRWZLWKLQWKH&&&¶VUHPLWDFWXDOO\WR
recommend doing so.  
 
An issue with setting 5-year budgets is defining exactly how 
the budgets are expressed because the stock of carbon in 
the atmosphere is more important for global warming than 
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the flow. For example, meeting the 5 year target by a large 
reduction in the final year will leave more carbon in the 
atmosphere, and cause more global warming, than a 
gradual reduction. 
 
Targets for 2011 and 2012 are relatively small reductions, 
most likely due to the recession but from 2014 onwards 
there is a 2-3% decrease in emissions year on year. There 
is a substantial one-off increase in emissions reductions in 
2013 (9.9% relative to the previous year) due to the 
beginning of the third phase of the EU ETS and therefore 
WKHH[SHFWHGWLJKWHQLQJRI6FRWODQG¶VDOORFDWLRQLQWKHWUDGHG
sector. The Act requires reductions from 2020 to be at least 
3% each year.  
 
The Scottish annual targets were initially to be passed in 
secondary legislation in April 2010 but the first set of targets 
were rejected by a slight majority in the Scottish Parliament 
for not going far enough, as a pledge of annual 3% 
reductions each year was made in the SNP manifesto. A 
short-lived cross-party working group was then established 
to revisit these annual targets and suggest amendments. 
The targets shown above have been set out in the most 
recent Draft Order (not yet legally binding) laid before 
Parliament in September 2010. 
 
Aviation and shipping 
International aviation and shipping both cause considerable 
GHG emissions and so the Scottish framework explicitly 
includes international aviation and shipping in its emissions 
reduction targets. However, these are not yet included at the 
UK or EU level and there is no agreed method for 
DFFRXQWLQJIRUWKHVHVHFWRU¶VHPLVVLRQV7KHPDLQTXHVWLRQ
to ask is whether the Scottish Government can influence 
emissions in these sectors. If it cannot, then what are the 
implications of including them amongst the target 
reductions; and even if the Scottish Government can 
influence those emissions, would it be desirable to do so 
unilaterally?  
 
There is likely to be considerable growth of emissions in 
international aviation and shipping, given previous trends. 
Therefore action on these sectors is imperative for tackling 
climate change. However, the ability to make significant 
reductions in these sectors is mostly outwith Scottish 
Government control unless it plans to severely limit travel 
and exports11.  Due to the international nature, the CCC do 
not attempt to identify policies that the Scottish Government 
could use to reduce emissions in these sectors. Instead, 
given the growth trends in international aviation and 
shipping, the CCC (2010) believes that GHG emission 
reductions of 44% will be necessary in the other sectors of 
the economy (i.e. the total economy less aviation and 
shipping) in order to meet the 42% Scottish target.  
Even if it were possible for the Scottish Government to 
reduce its emissions from aviation and shipping, it seems 
inappropriate, given the international nature of these 
sectors, to include them in national targets before they are 
included on an international scale. Limiting emissions in 
these sectors before other countries could lead to serious 
competitiveness affects. Exactly how these sectors are 
included is also an issue because the production-orientated-
nature of the targets makes it difficult to attribute emissions 
accurately. These sectors would lend themselves better to a 
consumption-based accounting methodology. It seems more 
likely that separate international sectoral agreements will be 
required in the long-run.  
 
From 2012 domestic aviation will be part of the EU ETS 
traded sector and will therefore be outwith Scottish control 
for accounting purposes. A specific issue with the EU ETS is 
that it only targets CO2 and therefore misses many of the 
other greenhouse gases (GHGs) attributable to aviation 
which are included in the emissions reduction targets.  
 
Banking and borrowing 
There is no banking or borrowing allowed between each 
year of the annual Scottish emissions budgets. Each yearly 
budget must be met, and any over-fulfilment cannot be 
carried over into future periods. This provides certainty in 
terms of targets but severely reduces the flexibility of 
meeting them, especially in years of significant variation in 
energy use and there is also no incentive to go beyond the 
necessary in reducing emissions in a given year.  If targets 
are consistently met this may be very beneficial as the 
credible policy provides certainty to investors. However, if 
targets are frequently missed, in part because of their 
inflexibility, then the credibility of the annual targets will 
ultimately be undermined and perhaps the credibility of the 
government as a whole. If there are signs of this happening 
in practice then banking and borrowing should be 
considered as a means of allowing budgets to be met more 
flexibly between years. For example, annual targets cannot 
take into consideration outside events such as colder than 
anticipated winters, power generation shutting down or a 
force majeure, such as the limited air travel due to the 
volcanic ash in April 2010. 
 
Use of credits 
Purchase of credits may be used to help Scotland achieve 
its emissions reduction targets. These may be through the 
EU ETS or the various Kyoto mechanisms which are 
discussed in Section 2. As discussed already, there is no 
limit on the use of European Union Allowances (EUAs), as 
these can be freely traded within the EU ETS and will count 
WRZDUGV6FRWODQG¶VWUDGHGVHFWRUWDUJHW+RZHYHUWKHUHLVD
OLPLWRQWKH³RIIVHWFUHGLWV´SXUFKDVHGIURPWKH.\RWRIOH[LEOH
mechanisms such as JI or CDM. The Climate Change 
Scotland Act puts a limit of 20% on emissions reductions 
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Figure 1: Scottish annual climate change targets - % decrease from previous year 
 
 
 
 
Source:  http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2010/09/22133935 
 
being made by purchased Kyoto credits which can be used 
to meet the non-traded sector target. This cap is set to 
ensure that the emissions reductions are met mainly 
through domestic measures. Theoretically these flexible 
mechanism projects would achieve abatement at lowest 
cost. However, there are two concerns about their use. 
Firstly, extensive use of credits would not incentivise the 
necessary changes in the infrastructure of the economy to 
put the country on a path to making its 2050 reduction. This 
would leave us dependent upon reductions in other nations 
to make the target. Secondly, there are concerns that no 
significant reductions would be made if the use of Kyoto 
credits are not limited, as uncertainty exists about their true 
benefits. This scepticism is due to the difficulty in proving 
WKHµDGGLWLRQDOLW\¶RIVXFKSURMHFWVDJDLQVWDK\SRWKHWLFDO
baseline scenario. If these projects are really not credible, 
then the whole process could be undermined13.  Therefore 
domestic emissions reductions, which can be more 
accurately measured, are the preferred means of meeting 
the targets.  
 
Given the lack of flexibility of annual targets and the 
absence of banking or borrowing, then purchasing credits 
may become important as a method of meeting Scottish 
targets in years of fluctuation in emissions. This may be 
expensive. The CCC (2010) suggests credits may have to 
play a significant part in Scotland meeting its emissions 
reduction target, especially if there is no global deal. They 
estimate that a 20% emissions reduction commitment by the 
EU would require Scotland to purchase credits from the 
Kyoto mechanisms to cover a range of 9% to 17% of its 
reductions at an estimated cost of around £30million to 
£50million in 2020 in order to meet its emissions reduction 
targets. This is the most likely scenario but would fall within 
the 20% limit on credits set in the Climate Change Scotland 
Act and so would allow Scotland to meet its emissions 
reduction target. The amount of credits needed to contribute 
would be much less under the stricter 30% EU target, with 
up to 5% of the 2020 target being met by offset credits 
costing a maximum of £15 million (CCC, 2010, p. 42). Only 
time will tell if circumstances arise in which the Scottish 
Government must buy credits to meet their own self-
imposed targets and if so, how they can justify this spending 
to the public 
 
4.  Low carbon technologies 
As stated in Section 3, under the accounting principles of 
the Climate Change (Scotland) Act, low carbon technologies 
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cannot contribute towards meeting emissions reduction 
WDUJHWVDW6FRWWLVKOHYHO7KLVLVEHFDXVHWKH8.¶VHPLVVLRQV
targets are bound to the EU ETS. Low carbon technologies 
FDQQRWDIIHFW6FRWODQG¶VSHUIRUPDQFHLQPHHWLQJLWV
emission reduction targets because emissions from 
electricity production are covered by the EU ETS. In theory 
a policy instrument such as the EU ETS, which prices 
carbon, should achieve the necessary emissions reductions 
efficiently and thereby induce the desired level of investment 
in low carbon technolgies. Therefore having a renewables 
target (and corresponding instrument, such as ROCs, 
discussed below), for example, only serve to raise costs and 
so prove inefficient. However, Sorrell and Sijm (2003) argue 
that, although additional policy instruments bring no 
efficiency gains, they can achieve other objectives such as 
stimulating investment in R&D where inducing initial 
investment is difficult because of moral hazard and 
imperfect information. In a Scottish context, renewables can 
be seen as contributing to other Government energy policy 
goals such as security of supply, and offering potential for 
economic development through the exploitation of low-
carbon technologies. 
 
Independently of the emissions reduction targets set out in 
the Climate Change Scotland Act, the Scottish Government 
has other policies and targets for the traded sector, in 
particular energy generation. The details and possible 
motivations of these policies are discussed below. 
 
$µQRQHZQXFOHDU¶SROLF\LVKHOGE\WKHcurrent Scottish 
Government with regards WR6FRWODQG¶VHQHUJ\SRUWIROLR14. 
7KLVLVHVSHFLDOO\LPSRUWDQWJLYHQWKDW6FRWODQG¶VQXFOHDU
generating facilities are coming to the end of their life with 
Hunterston and Torness both scheduled to close (some 
30% of 6FRWODQG¶VHOHFWULFLW\LVFXUUHQWO\JHQHUDWHGE\WKLV
source). Furthermore, a substantial proportion of coal-fired 
SRZHUSODQWVDUHGXHWRUHWLUHE\7KH³QRQHZ
QXFOHDU´SRVLWLRQLVQRWHQVKULQHGLQDQ\OHJLVODWLRQEXW
reflects the stance of the two main political parties. This may 
partially reflect concerns of safety and disposal and also a 
perceived link between nuclear energy and nuclear 
weapons. In terms of climate change policy, a lack of 
nuclear capacity limits the options available for low-cost, 
low-carbon technologies available to replace emissions-
intensive electricity generation. The UK government is 
pursuing nuclear within its future energy portfolio, and given 
the integration of the British electricity market, it will be the 
case that the costs of the UK government developing 
nuclear power will be distributed among all British electricity 
consumers, including those in Scotland (Bellingham, 2008).  
 
It is not clear how Scotland will fill the energy supply gap but 
most likely this will be through the harnessing of various 
renewable energy sources15. In practice the energy gap will 
be met by market circumstances and investor decisions, 
however, the Scottish Government can indirectly attempt to 
influence the energy supply through its renewables policy. 
This is reflected in the fact that the Scottish Government has 
recently set a very demanding renewable electricity target of 
IRULHRI6FRWODQG¶VHOHFWULFLW\FRQVXPSWLRQ
must come from renewable sources16. The Scottish 
Government sees the potential benefit that renewables can 
have in terms of achieving energy policy goals, such as 
stimulating economic growth and promoting security of 
supply through diversity of generation sources. However, if 
the Scottish Government believes that renewables are 
contributing towards achieving Scottish climate change 
targets, they are misguided. Also, it is highly unlikely that 
strict climate change targets will do much in practice to help 
attract substantial investment in low-carbon technologies. 
Regardless of these facts, the CCC believes there is still a 
need for low carbon generation, even if it is not part of the 
HPLVVLRQVWDUJHWVEHFDXVH³JLYHQWKDW6FRWODQGKDVDQ
80% target to reduce emissions, it is important not only that 
the traded sector cap is achieved, but that the way this is 
achieved is consistent with the longer-term path to an 80% 
emissions reduction in 2050 relative to 1990. Specifically, 
this path requires early decarbonisation of the power sector, 
and extension of low-carbon power to other sectors, namely 
through electric forms of transport and heat17´7KLV
reasoning appears to be based upon long-term R&D 
considerations. Towards 2050 there will be increased 
electricity requirements, for instance, through significant 
predicted increases in electric transport. During the next few 
decades, as we have already stated, there will also be 
retirement of many current power generators. It therefore 
makes no sense to provide this electricity from dirty 
generating sources if we are serious about reducing 
emissions. However, there is not a credible carbon price 
that extends this far into the future. Therefore there is a 
need to put significant research and development into 
renewables in order to provide a diverse, low-carbon power 
sector. 
 
Meeting the 80% renewables target, while providing an 
adequate energy supply, will require tapping into the 
extensive renewable energy resources available in 
Scotland. A significant anticipated benefit is job creation in 
UHQHZDEOHVDQGRWKHU³JUHHQ´LQGXVWULHVThis may also lead 
to Scotland becoming an exporter of renewable energy 
(Allan et al, 2007) and possibly also an exporter of 
renewable technology itself and its operative and 
management experience (Allan et al, 2010b). These 
benefits will only be fully realised if renewables projects 
embody limited imported materials and labour18. Onshore 
wind has been the major technology deployed so far in 
Scotland but it brings its own problem because of its 
intermittent nature, and therefore variable output, requiring a 
back-up to ensure supply meets demand19.   Offshore wind 
and marine technologies have the potential to play an 
important role in Scotland given their abundance, although 
the peripheral location of the most promising resources 
provides new challenges to distribution and transmission20.  
,WLVHVWLPDWHGWKDW6FRWODQGKDVRI(XURSH¶V7LGDODQG
Offshore wind power and 10% of its Wave power potential. 
 
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology also has the 
potential in Scotland to stop emissions from coal or gas 
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combustion being released into the atmosphere. CCS could 
be fitted to new or old power stations and allow for the use 
of coal and gas but without their significant CO2 emissions 
reaching the atmosphere. This is likely to be expensive to 
fund however as the technology has not yet been tested on 
a commercial scale, and these costs will likely be passed 
onto consumers through higher energy prices. The UK 
government announced a CCS demonstration competition 
as well as setting up an Office of Carbon Capture and 
Storage to coordinate the approach to CCS in the UK; this 
appears to be somewhat behind schedule. The EU has also 
passed a Directive on CCS and will use EU ETS proceeds 
to fund up to 12 CCS demonstrations. The development of 
CCS may take some time but Scotland has substantial 
capabilities to use its experience with the North Sea oil and 
gas industry, and the availability of extensive underground 
storage capacity, to help become a leader in CCS 
technology and use it to help achieve its environmental 
goals. The Scottish Government has produced its own 
URDGPDSDVWRKRZ6FRWODQGFDQEHFRPH(XURSH¶VOHDGHULQ
CCS technology (Scottish Government and Scottish 
Enterprise, 2010), the funding of which will be through EU 
and additional Scottish Government support. The export 
potential of CCS is particularly significant given that it could 
be adopted worldwide in countries which use coal and gas. 
In terms of the EU ETS it is not clear what will happen with 
CCS. Perhaps those installations fitted with CCS will be 
exempt from the EU ETS or they will otherwise be able to 
sell all their allowances. Overall, renewables should be 
preferred over CCS because although CCS helps to 
decarbonise the economy, in the long run and we would still 
be reliant upon finite fossil fuels and so it does not help 
address the energy supply. However, this does not diminish 
the value of CCS as an incredibly useful but ultimately short-
to±medium term solution to reduce carbon emissions across 
the globe. 
 
5.  Policy instruments 
Scotland is part of the United Kingdom and the European 
Union, and as such is subject to many of their climate 
change policies. At EU level Scotland is already included in 
the EU 20-20-20 targets for 2020 and policy instruments 
such as the EU ETS. At the UK level there are instruments 
such as the Climate Change Levy and the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment, renewables instruments such as 
Feed-in Tariffs (FiTs) and ROCs and there are institutions 
such as the Carbon Trust and the Energy Saving Trust. The 
Scottish Government must adhere to these given their 
limited devolved powers but must also use what it has at its 
disposal to achieve its own goals and the annual targets it 
sets.  
 
The setting of emissions targets themselves may be seen 
as an instrument with which to achieve Scottish climate 
change goals. If targets are believed to be credible (i.e. in 
practice, if they are met year on year) then the mere setting 
of them may influence expectations sufficiently to alter 
behaviour, for example to induce investment in low carbon 
technologies. However, any such impact is likely to be short-
lived if the Scottish Government consistently failed to meet 
its targets. It seems unlikely, in practice, that targets could 
be judged as being instruments, especially as there is no 
clear policy lever to make sure they are met. However, 
additional credibility of the targets may be brought about by 
advice on, and monitoring of, targets by an independent 
agency. The Climate Change (Scotland) Act allows for the 
possibility of a Scottish Committee on Climate Change to 
provide advice and progress towards annual targets. So far 
this possibility has not been utilised. However the Scottish 
Government commissioned a report from the Committee on 
Climate Change whose role it is to do this for the UK 
government (CCC, 2010)21.  
 
The Scottish government has some other available options 
in terms of policy instruments. Firstly, the Scottish 
Government has been able to use its planning powers to 
help accelerate the achievement of its goals. An example of 
the use of planning permission is the acceptance of the 
Beauly to Denny power line, the creation of which will 
substantially enhance grid capabilities in Scotland. It will 
allow for easier transmission of electricity, in particular that 
generated by renewable sources located in peripheral areas 
to places of high energy consumption. Secondly, the 
Scottish Government can make funding available for energy 
efficiency improvements and legislate to ensure efficiency 
standards in important emitting sectors such as transport, 
housing and agriculture. This may be through regulating 
efficiency standards e.g. of insulation, heating and lighting 
and also undertaking demand-side initiatives for transport, 
such as encouraging public transport, car sharing and lower 
speed limits. Thirdly, there is the option of purchasing offset 
credits from the Kyoto mechanisms in order to meet 
emissions reduction targets. This may prove to be the 
cheapest option in the short-run if the price of these credits 
are low but, given the limit of 20% credit purchase in the 
Climate Change (Scotland) Act, they cannot rely heavily 
upon credits. A fourth possible, but ultimately unlikely, action 
is for the Scottish Government to use its limited fiscal 
powers to inhibit growth in the economy in order to satisfy 
their climate change targets. This is highly unlikely given the 
potential consequences of such action but it should be 
noted that sustained low growth may make the achievement 
of targets possible i.e. targets may be met entirely 
fortuitously, rather than as a consequence of policy action. 
 
In practice, the uptake of renewables will be achieved, not 
by climate change or renewables targets, but by direct 
funding and financial support over the time-scale necessary 
for investments. Extensive exploitation of renewable 
sources will require substantial funding by the Scottish and 
UK Governments in conjunction with the regulator Ofgem, 
given the integrated nature of the electricity market. How 
renewables are funded is a political decision but one which 
requires a EDODQFHEHWZHHQSRWHQWLDOO\³SLFNLQJZLQQHUV´RQ
the one hand and effectively encouraging only the 
technology closest to market (a consequence of a 
³WHFKQRORJ\EOLQG´DSSURDFK,QWKH8.UHQHZDEOHVDUH
substantially supported by the Renewable Obligation 
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scheme which the Scottish government helps coordinate 
with other administrations and which Ofgem administers. 
This is a trading scheme that requires electricity suppliers to 
provide a certain amount of renewable power or face a 
SHQDOW\7KH³EDQGLQJ´RI5OCs was introduced by the UK 
Government to provide greater funding for newer 
technologies and by making them more cost competitive, to 
allow them to develop faster. The Scottish Government 
have gone even further and modified the ROC scheme so 
that wave and tidal energy receive greater funding in 
Scotland, than at UK level. At UK level wave and tidal power 
receive 2 ROCs per MW/hr but in Scotland wave now 
receives the equivalent of 5 ROCs per MW/hr and tidal 
receives 3 ROCs per MW/hr. This enhanced banding is 
particularly important for the marine energy sector, and may 
make tidal power comparable in costs to that of onshore 
wind (Allan et al, 2010c). However, it is not yet clear how 
this differential incentive is to be funded. Also, in April 2010 
a UK-wide feed-in Tariff scheme (FiTs) was introduced to 
provide support for small-scale electricity generators22. The 
downside of this type of funding for renewables is that most 
of the high support costs are passed on to consumers in the 
form of higher energy prices. The Scottish Government also 
provides support through other schemes, funds and prizes 
to promote renewables, such as the Saltire Prize. 
 
 
Overall, there are limited powers available to the Scottish 
Government to achieve its substantial climate change goal 
of effecting a 42% reduction in emissions by 2020. Why the 
Scottish Climate Change Act set an emissions reduction 
target which differs from the UK target, is not entirely 
obvious. It does not appear to be purely a supply-side 
decision as 42% is a very ambitious target that will not 
necessarily be easily met on current trends and maybe 
therefore require the purchase of offset credits. It may 
reflect a political stance in Scotland that is more sympathetic 
towards environmental objectives. One possibility is that, 
given the limited instruments available to the Scottish 
Government, in order to achieve their goals they are 
seeking to influence authorities, such as the UK 
Government, that do have more powerful instruments 
available. By setting the demanding 42% reduction target 
the Scottish Government may be seeking to influence UK 
policy.  
 
 
One possible option would be for the Scottish Government 
to change the nature of the targets, or supplement them with 
additional targets focussed solely upon emissions generated 
within Scottish borders.  Although this change goes against 
the principle of the EU ETS, in which the geographic 
location of emissions reductions is essentially irrelevant, it 
would provide a direct measure of emissions reductions 
ZLWKLQ6FRWODQG¶VERUGHUV&OHDUO\LQWKLVFDVH6FRWODQG¶V
new 80% renewables target may influence actual domestic 
&2HPLVVLRQVZKLOHQRWFRQWULEXWLQJWRWKH8.¶VHPLVVLRQV
reduction target. 
 
6.  Conclusions and further research 
The aspiration of Scottish climate change policy, as 
expressed in their targets, is world leading. Currently the 
Scottish climate change framework is more ambitious than 
the UK counterpart. It includes international aviation and 
shipping, is independent of the EU framework and it sets 
annual targets. These make the Scottish framework tougher 
but less flexible than its UK equivalent. The Scottish targets 
will be more difficult to achieve but, if achieved, then this 
framework could provide an appropriate contribution to 
6FRWODQG¶VHIIRUWWRZDUGVPLWLJDting global climate change. 
These targets may also indirectly provide a credible 
incentive for substantial investment in renewable energy in 
Scotland,though direct funding for renewables is more 
appropriate in achieving this goal. If targets are missed 
regularly they will begin to lose credibility. Then measures 
such as banking, borrowing, using credits and adopting less 
frequent targets, should be taken to create more flexibility in 
meeting the targets. However, it is not clear that the Scottish 
Government actually has sufficient policy instruments to 
ensure achievement of its emissions reduction targets. 
 
One major issue currently is that the Climate Change 
(Scotland) Act does not allow for the contribution of 
renewables towards the emissions reduction targets. 
6FRWODQG¶VHOHFWULFLW\VHFWRULVSDUWRIWKH(8(76WUDGHG
VHFWRUDQGDVVXFKHPLVVLRQVWKDW³FRXQW´KHUHDUHQRW
6FRWODQG¶VDFWXDOHPLVVLRQVIURPHOHFWULFLW\JHQHUDWLRQEXW
their share under the EU ETS. The Scottish Government 
has other energy policy goals of security of supply, price 
and economic growth. It has specific policies on achieving 
growth through renewables, with an 80% renewables target 
by 2020, and also phasing-out nuclear power, a decision at 
odds with emissions reductions given nuclear may be a 
cheap low-carbon option. Scotland has the potential to 
utilise and create new industries for low-carbon 
technologies. Large-scale deployment of technologies such 
as onshore and offshore wind, as well as a marine energy, 
could help promote a diverse and potentially lucrative 
renewable energy sector. However, given the current costs, 
these infant industries will require substantial support and 
funding from the Scottish and UK Governments through 
mechanisms such as ROCs. These must be set 
appropriately to induce the levels of investment necessary 
to meet the renewables targets. It is likely that costs from 
increasing renewable penetration will be passed onto 
consumers in the form of higher energy prices. Carbon 
capture and storage also has a role to play in helping to limit 
emissions from dirtier sources and there is also a potential 
for a growing worldwide industry too. CCS will require 
substantial development support to make it large-scale and 
regulation to enforce its adoption but ultimately it is not a 
long-term option. 
 
Many determinants of emissions are beyond Scottish 
Government control e.g. energy prices, the EU ETS price 
and tax raising capabilities reserved to the UK Government. 
Therefore, should Scotland have its own climate change 
targets at all? The answer is probably no. Given that they do 
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however, the Scottish Government must use the powers 
they have, such as planning permission, encouragement for 
renewables and efficiency benchmarking in the non-traded 
sectors, to maximum effect if they are to achieve the targets 
they have set. Perhaps it could set targets that are more 
obviously linked to the available instruments, specifically on 
the non-traded sector. Of course, the absence of 
instruments does not imply that the targets will not be 
achieved: they may be but as a consequence of forces 
RXWVLGHWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VFRQWUROHJDSURORQJHG
period of low growth or a warm winter. Therefore it is 
important to know why and how targets are met. While there 
is a lack of instruments presently the Scottish Government 
may seek to exert influence on those that do have the 
necessary instruments or there may be a possible argument 
for granting more powers to the Scottish Government by 
extending the devolution agreement. Another option would 
be to change or supplement the accounting of emissions 
within the Scottish framework, to make it those emissions 
SURGXFHGZLWKLQ6FRWODQG¶VERUGHUWKDQFRXQWWRZDUGVWKH
target and preferably make sure all GHGs are included 
within these targets.  
 
This paper is intended to provide a brief summary of the 
main issues that are specific to climate change policy in 
Scotland. We think it is far from clear that Scotland currently 
has the range of instruments that it would require to achieve 
its own targets. If this is the case then there are only a few 
solutions. One response may be for the Scottish 
Government to push for more instruments and this could be 
done by extending the powers afforded to them through 
devolution. Another response would be to either reduce the 
targets and thereby making them easier to meet, or to set 
different targets that the Scottish Government has more 
control over. What is quite clear is that it would be useful to 
extend evidence base relating to the feasibility, and likely 
costs, of any climate change policies. The CCC and DECC 
are considering some of these in detail. It would be useful, 
for example, to develop an energy-environment-economy 
model of the economy to simulate system-wide effects of 
changes in policy instruments through to the final goal 
outcomes.  
 
____________________ 
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